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In this paper, we present an agent-based, evolutionary, model of output- and labor-
market dynamics. Firms produce a homogeneous, perishable good under constant returns
to scale using labor only. Labor productivities are ﬁrm-speciﬁc and change stochastically
due to technical progress. The key feature of the model resides in an explicit microfounda-
tion of the processes of: (i) matching between ﬁrms and workers, (ii) job search, (iii) wage
setting, (iv) endogenous formation of aggregate demand, and (v) endogenous price forma-
tion. Moreover, we allow for a competitive process entailing selection of ﬁrms on the basis
of their revealed competitiveness. Simulations show that the model is able to robustly
reproduce Beveridge, Wage and Okun curves under quite broad behavioral and institu-
tional settings. The system generates endogenously an Okun coeﬃcient greater than one
even if individual ﬁrms employ production functions exhibiting constant returns to labor.
Monte Carlo simulations also indicate that statistically detectable shifts in Okun and
Beveridge curves emerge as the result of changes in institutional, behavioral, and tech-
nological parameters. Finally, the model generates sharp predictions about how system
parameters aﬀect aggregate performance (i.e. average GDP growth) and its volatility.
Keywords: Labor markets; dynamics; aggregate regularities; Beveridge curve; Okun
curve; wage curve; matching models.
1. Introduction
In the last decades, the issue of microfoundations of macroeconomic dynamics
has played a central role in the economic profession (cf. Ref. 16 for a discussion).
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Theoretical explanations of observed aggregate regularities have at least begun to
employ formal frameworks where macroeconomic outcomes are interpreted as the
result of the interactions of individual ﬁrms, workers, consumers, etc.
Traditionally, eﬀorts of microfounding macroeconomic dynamics have been
grounded upon a hyper-rational, maximizing, “representative agent”, thus avoiding
by construction the challenges posed by aggregation of heterogeneous agents [24].
Despite the fact that their high formal sophistication, the degrees of success
of these models is, at best, mixed. In particular, they turn out to be unable to
jointly account for multiple empirically observed “stylized facts.” For example, as
far as labor market dynamics is concerned, existing literature seems to completely
lack a joint explanation of the most important aggregate regularities concerning:
(i) the process through which ﬁrms and workers meet in the labor market; (ii) how
this matching process aﬀects wage setting and (un)employment dynamics; (iii) the
extent to which unemployment and output interact over the business cycle.a
More speciﬁcally, existing (standard) microfoundations of labor market dynam-
ics seem to have failed in jointly explaining three crucial stylized facts that one
can typically observe in the data, namely: (a) the Beveridge curve, which predicts a
negative relationship between rates of vacancies and rates of unemployment; (b) the
Phillips (respectively, Wage) curve, suggesting that changes in wage rates (respec-
tively, levels of wage rates) are negatively related to unemployment rates; (c) the
Okun curve, which posits a more than proportional increase in real GDP for every
one percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate.
In this paper, we propose an alternative, evolutionary-based, approach to the
microfoundation of labor-market and output dynamics.b In the model we present in
the following, the economy is populated by boundedly-rational ﬁrms and workers.
Firms produce a homogeneous, perishable good under constant returns to scale
using labor as the sole input of production. Workers are skill-homogeneous and buy
the good spending all their wages. Labor productivities are ﬁrm-speciﬁc and change
stochastically due to technical progress. Both ﬁrms and workers hold expectations
about desired wages they want to oﬀer and get, and they are able to adaptively
revise their expectations on the basis of observed market dynamics.
A key feature of the model resides in an explicit microfoundation of the pro-
cesses of: (i) matching between ﬁrms and workers; (ii) job search; (iii) wage setting;
(iv) endogenous formation of aggregate demand; (v) endogenous price formation.
Moreover, in the spirit of evolutionary-based approaches, we allow for selection (e.g.
exit) of ﬁrms on the basis of their revealed competitiveness (as measured by last-
period proﬁts). Since ﬁrms interact both in the labor market and in the product
aFor a quite exhaustive overview of the state-of-the-art of both theoretical and empirical labor
market literature, cf. Refs. 3, 4 and 36.
bMore on the general Weltanschauung of the evolutionary approach is in Refs. 15 and 17.
The model we present has large overlappings with the “Agent-Based Computational Economics”
(ACE) approach [1,18,40], as well as with self-organization models of labor markets pioneered by
Lesourne [28].
July 28, 2004 0:15 WSPC/169-ACS 00013
An Evolutionary Model of Labor Market and Output Dynamics 159
market, their revealed competitiveness is aﬀected not only by their production deci-
sions, but also by their hiring and wage-setting behaviors.
Macroeconomic dynamics is generated in the model via aggregation of individ-
ual behaviors. Statistical properties exhibited by aggregate variables might then
be interpreted as emergent properties grounded on persistent micro disequilibria.
Consequently, even when some equilibrium relationship exists between aggregate
variables (e.g. inﬂows and outﬂows from unemployment), the economy might per-
sistently depart from it and follow some disequilibrium path. The observed stable
relations amongst those same aggregate variables might emerge out of turbulent,
disequilibrium, microeconomic interactions.
Computer simulations show that the model is able to robustly and jointly repro-
duce Beveridge, Wage and Okun curves over suﬃciently large regions of the param-
eter space. Moreover, the system endogenously generates (absolute values of) Okun
coeﬃcients larger than one even if production at the individual level does not enjoy
increasing returns to labor. Monte Carlo simulations also indicate that statistically
detectable shifts in Okun and Beveridge curves emerge as the result of changes in
institutional, behavioral, and technological parameters. Finally, the model generates
quite sharp predictions about how system parameters aﬀect aggregate performance
(i.e. average GDP growth) and its volatility.
Our results lend support to a disequilibrium foundation of aggregate regulari-
ties: despite the fact that the economy always departs from equilibrium (if any),
aggregate regularities emerge as the outcome of decentralized interactions, adaptive
behavioral adjustments, and imperfect coordination.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we brieﬂy survey empirical ﬁndings
about aggregate regularities in labor market dynamics and we discuss how main-
stream economic theory has been trying to provide explanations of such stylized
facts. In Sec. 3, we introduce the model. Sections 4 and 5 present the results of
simulation exercises. Finally, in Sec. 6 we draw some concluding remarks.
2. Labor Market Dynamics: Empirical Findings
and Theoretical Explanations
When dealing with the interplay between labor market and output dynamics, three
aggregate stylized facts stand out.
First, the Beveridge curve (BC) postulates a negative relationship (over time)
between the rate of unemployment u and the rate of vacancies v, where rates are
deﬁned in terms of total employment.c The intuition is simple: if an economy exper-
iments higher level of vacancies — in turn plausibly corresponding to a higher level
of aggregate demand — it is easier for workers to ﬁnd a job. Thus, one should also
cObservation of reliable proxies for actual vacancies entails many empirical problems, especially in
Europe, see Ref. 39. For instance, one is typically bounded to observe only ex-ante vacancies (i.e.
job openings). Ex-post vacancies (i.e. unﬁlled job openings) are much more aﬀected by frictions
than ex-ante ones and thus should be in principle preferred as object of analysis.
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observe a lower level of unemployment. Movements along the curve should be typi-
cally induced by the business cycle, while the position of the BC in the (u, v) space
is typically related to the degree of “frictions” in the market and, more generally,
to its institutional setting. The closer the curve to the axes, the lower — ceteris
paribus — market “frictions,” cf. Ref. 29.
As far as co-movements between unemployment and wages are concerned, a sec-
ond and complementary empirical regularity is the famous Phillips curve (i.e. neg-
ative relationship between changes of the wage rate and the unemployment rate);
or the alternative Wage curve [8], which characterizes economies with a negative
relationship between levels of the wage rate and the unemployment rate [7, 14, 20].
Empirical studies [8, 13] show that in homogeneous areas, WC is in general valid,
while PC is not.d This empirical evidence seems to robustly hold across regions,
countries, etc. but also among diﬀerent institutional setups [9, 10]. The interpreta-
tion of a WC is quite controversial and bears some important theoretical implica-
tions. For instance, the competitive equilibrium framework cannot be invoked to
account for WC emergence. In fact, a competitive labor market with all its canonical
features would lead to a positive correlation between the unemployment rate and
the wage rate. Climbing up a downward demand for labor schedule — i.e. raising
wages — would indeed induce higher levels of unemployment, as the unmet supply
of labor would grow.
A third fundamental aggregate regularity is the Okun curve (OC), which char-
acterizes the interplay between labor markets and economic activity [30,31]. Inspec-
tion of aggregate data typically shows that a decrease of one percentage point in the
unemployment rate is associated — ceteris paribus — with a growth rate of GDP of
about two to three percentage points (according to original Okun estimations). The
standard interpretation runs in terms of under-utilization of labor resources with
respect to full employment, carrying a more-than-proportional eﬀect on economic
activity [5, 37].
Mainstream economic theory has been trying to explain the foregoing aggre-
gate regularities in the familiar equilibrium-cum-rationality framework, building the
explanation on the shoulder of hyper-rational, maximizing, representative worker
and ﬁrm. Hence, any aggregate regularity is interpreted as the equilibrium outcome
of some maximizing exercises carried out by such agents.
A paradigmatic example of such modeling strategy can be found within the
theoretical literature aimed at micro-founding and explaining the BC [6, 36].
In these models, all search and matching, which in reality is an inherently dynamic
process, is described in a static setting by means of a deterministic (aggregate)
dAs the WC pertains to homogeneous data cells, one cannot “see it” in rough data. Panel data
estimation must be performed in order to control for variables such as personal characteristics
of workers, labor market institutions, “ﬁxed” eﬀects allowing to discriminate among sectors or
regions, etc.
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matching function, whose functional form and parametric assumptions tautologi-
cally imply a BC. The latter is treated as a static (long-run) equilibrium locus in
the unemployment-vacancy space. Furthermore, one typically requires that all ﬂows
in and out of unemployment must always compensate.e Needless to say, this is at
odds with any empirical observation.
Moreover, in order to get the desired results, many over-simplifying assump-
tions are required. First, the environment must be strictly stationary, ruling out
any form of technological and organizational change, as well as any type of endoge-
nous selection amongst ﬁrms and workers. Second, the presence of a hyper-rational,
representative individual rules out the possibility of accounting for any form of het-
erogeneity across ﬁrms and workers. More than that: it excludes the very possibility
of analyzing any interaction process among agents (cf. Ref. 25 for a discussion).
Third, as a consequence, one is prevented from studying the dynamic outcomes of
multiple (reversible) decisions of hiring, ﬁring, quitting, and searching which unfold
over time.
Similar critiques also apply to the purported micro-foundations of Wage and
Okun curves.f Therefore, despite the existence of some competing, although not
entirely persuasive, interpretations of each of the three aggregate regularities taken
in isolation, the economic literature witnesses a dramatic lack of theories attempting
to jointly explain Beveridge, Okun and Wage curves.
In the following, we begin to explore a radically diﬀerent path and study
the properties of a model where the most stringent assumptions of standard for-
malizations are abandoned and we explicitly account for the processes of out-of-
equilibrium interactions among heterogeneous agents. We will try to provide an
explicit microfoundation — within an evolutionary framework — of labor market
dynamics regarding the processes governing e.g. job opening, job search, matching,
bargaining, and wage setting.
Notice that the bottom line of the exercises belonging to the “pure equilibrium”
genre is that they turn out to be unable, almost by construction, to account for
involuntary unemployment or even endogenous changes in the “equilibrium” rates
of unemployment.
It must be noticed that important advances, incrementally departing from the
standard model, have nevertheless tried to incorporate agents’ informational lim-
itations, in order to account for phenomena such as endogenous ﬂuctuations in
aggregate activity and persistent involuntary unemployment (see e.g. the seminal
works by Refs. 34 and 35).
In addition, some contributions have attempted to introduce “endogenous
matching” mechanisms to describe the (Walrasian) decentralized process governing
eOn the contrary, the model we present below allows the economy to evolve on a permanent
disequilibrium path.
fCf. Refs. 19 and 22 for a thorough discussion on this and related points.
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the meetings between ﬁrms and workers in the labor market.g This is certainly a
point our model takes on board in its full importance, and it does so through an
explicit account of the (disequilibrium) unfolding of the interaction process.
In this respect, our model has three important antecedents in the labor mar-
ket literature. First, the out-of-equilibrium, interaction-based, perspective that we
pursue is a distinctive feature of “self-organization” labor market models.h Second,
the ACE model in Ref. 41 also assumes many heterogenous, interacting agents,
characterized by “internal states” and behavioral rules, who exchange information
in the market. Third, Ref. 1 extends the ACE model of ﬂuctuations and growth
proposed in Ref. 2 to allow for unemployment dynamics.i
Notwithstanding many overlappings with “self-organization” and ACE formal-
izations, our model proposes advances, vis-a`-vis the state of the art in this area, at
least at four levels. First, it accounts for the co-evolutionary dynamics between the
labor market and the product market. More speciﬁcally, we try to nest labor mar-
ket interactions in what one could call a “general disequilibrium” framework with
endogenous aggregate demand. This feature allows us to study also market prop-
erties associated with an endogenous business cycle. Second, we explicitly model
(as endogenous processes) job opening, matching, wage bargaining, and wage set-
ting. Third, we allow for technical progress and the ensuing macroeconomic growth.
Fourth, in the analysis of the results we go beyond an “exercise in plausibility” and
we explicitly compare the statistical properties of the simulated environments with
empirically observed ones, speciﬁcally with respect to the emergence of Beveridge,
Wage, and Okun curves.
3. The Model
Consider an economy composed of F ﬁrms and N workers.j Time is discrete:
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . and there is a homogeneous, perishable good g whose price is pt > 0.
In each period, a ﬁrm i ∈ {1, . . . , F} produces qit units of good g using labor as the
sole input under a constant returns to scale (CRTS) regime:
qit = αitnit, (1)
where αit is the current labor productivity of ﬁrm i and nit is the number of workers
hired at t by ﬁrm i. Workers are homogeneous as far as their skills are concerned.
gSee Refs. 11, 12, 23, 27, 32 and 38.
hCf. Refs. 26 and 28. Self-organizing processes are discussed in Ref. 42.
iSimilarly to our model, co-evolution between product and labor market dynamics is explicitly
taken into account and simulations allow to reproduce (albeit in some benchmark parameteriza-
tions) Okun curves. However, matching and wage bargaining are not incorporated in the model as
endogenous processes. Therefore, no implications about wage and Phillips curves can be derived
from simulation exercises.
jNotice that the higher the ratio between the number of workers and the number of ﬁrms (N/F ),
the more economic activity is concentrated (i.e. a larger work force size must be employed in a
smaller number of ﬁrms). Therefore, the higher N/F , the smaller the overall frictions in the hiring
process.
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If the ﬁrm oﬀers a contractual wage wit to each worker, current proﬁts are
computed as
πit = ptqit − witnit = (ptαit−1 − wit)nit. (2)
Contractual wages oﬀered by ﬁrms to workers are the result of both a matching
and a bargaining process. We assume that any ﬁrm i has at time t a “satisﬁcing”
wage wsit it wants to oﬀer to any worker. Similarly, any worker j ∈ {1, . . . , N} has
at time t a “satisﬁcing” wage wsjt which he wants to get from ﬁrms. Moreover, any
worker j can only accept contractual wages if they are greater or equal to their
reservation wage wRj , which we assume to be constant over time for simplicity.
We start by studying an economy where jobs last only one period. Hence, work-
ers must search for a new job in any period. Job openings are equal to labor demand
and, at the same time, to “ex-ante” vacancies. However, workers can be unemployed
and ﬁrms might not satisfy their labor demand.
Let us turn now to a brief description of the ﬂow of events in a generic time-
period. We then move to a detailed account of each event separately.
3.1. Dynamics
Given the state of the system at the end of any time period t − 1, the timing of
events occurring in any time period t runs as follows.
(i) Firms decide how many jobs they want to open in period t.
(ii) Workers search for a ﬁrm posting at least one job opening and queue up.
(iii) Job matching and bargaining occur: ﬁrms look in their queues and start bar-
gaining with workers who have queued up (if any) to decide whether to hire
them or not.
(iv) After hiring, production takes place according to Eq. (1). Aggregate sup-
ply and demand are then formed simply by aggregating individual supplies
and demands. Subsequently, a “pseudo-Walrasian” price setting occurs.k We
assume that the price of good g at t is given by
ptQt = Wt, (3)
where Qt =
∑F
i=1 qit is aggregate (real) output and Wt =
∑N
j=1 wjt is total
wages. Thus, total wages equals aggregate demand, as we assume that workers
spend all their income to eat good g in any time period. Then, ﬁrms make
proﬁts:
πit = (ptαit−1 − wit)nit. (4)
(v) Given proﬁts, ﬁrms undergo a selection process: those making negative proﬁts
(πit < 0) exit and are replaced by entrants, which, as a ﬁrst approximation,
are simply “average” ﬁrms (see below).
kWe employ the simplifying assumption of an aggregate price setting mechanism to initially avoid
any additional market frictions coming from e.g. a decentralized price setting procedure.
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(vi) Firms and workers update their satisﬁcing wages (wsit−1 and w
s
jt−1).
(vii) Finally, technological progress (if any) takes place. We assume that in each
period labor productivity may increase at rates which are exogenous but
ﬁrm-speciﬁc (see below).
3.2. Job openings
At the beginning of period t, each ﬁrm creates a queue of job openings. Since in real-
ity only ex-ante vacancies (i.e. new job positions) can be empirically observed, we
will employ throughout the term job openings as a synonym of (ex-ante) vacancies.
“Ex-post” vacancies will be computed as the number of unﬁlled job-openings.
Let us then call vit the number of new positions opened by ﬁrm i at time t.
As far as the ﬁrm’s decision about how many vacancies to open is concerned, we
experiment with two alternative “behavioral” scenarios.
In the ﬁrst one, a ﬁrm simply observes current (i.e. time t− 1) price, quantity
produced and the contractual wage oﬀered, and sets vacancies vit as
vit = v¯it−1 =
⌈
pt−1qit−1
wit−1
⌉
, (5)
that is, it creates a queue with a number of open slots equal to the “ceiling” of (i.e.
the smallest integer larger than) the ratio between revenues and contractual wage
oﬀered in the last period. We call this job opening scenario the “Wild Market
Archetype,” in that no history-inherited institution or behavioral feature is built
into the model.
In the second “behavioral” scenario (which we shall call the “Weak Path-
Dependence” scenario), we introduce some rather mild path-dependence into the
vacancy setting. We suppose that: (a) jobs opened by any ﬁrm at time t are a non-
decreasing function of last-experienced proﬁts growth rate, and (b) cannot exceed
v¯it−1. More formally:
vit = min{v¯it−1, v∗it}, (6)
and
v∗it =


vit−1(1 + |X |), if ∆πit−1
πit−1
≥ 0,
vit−1(1− |X |), if ∆πit−1
πit−1
< 0,
(7)
where X is an i.i.d. random variable, normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2v > 0, and x denotes the ceiling of x. Notice that the higher σv, the
more ﬁrms react to any given proﬁts growth rate by enlarging or shrinking their
current queue size. Hence, a higher σv implies higher sensitivity to market signals.
Notice that, in both scenarios, ﬁrms always open at least one vacancy in each period.
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3.3. Job search
Similarly to job opening, we consider two “behavioral” scenarios for the job search
procedure employed by workers to ﬁnd a ﬁrm that has just opened new job positions.
In the ﬁrst one, called “No Search Inertia,” each worker j simply visits any ﬁrm
i in the market with a probability proportional to the last contractual wage wit−1
it oﬀered. If the selected ﬁrm has places still available in the queue, the worker gets
in and demands a wage equal to the “satisﬁcing” one, i.e. wsjt−1.
In the second scenario, which we label “Search Inertia,” we introduce some
stickiness (loyalty) in ﬁrm visiting. If worker j was employed by ﬁrm i in period
t − 1, he visits ﬁrst ﬁrm i. If i still has places available in the queue, the worker
gets in and demands wsjt−1. Otherwise, the worker employs the random rule above
(“No Search Inertia”) to select among the remaining F − 1 ﬁrms.
In both scenarios, a worker becomes unemployed if he chooses a ﬁrm who has
already ﬁlled all available slots in the queue.l
3.4. Job matching and bargaining
After workers have queued up, ﬁrms start exploring workers wage demands to match
them with their desiderata. Suppose that, at time t, ﬁrm i observes 0 < mit ≤ N
workers in the queue. Then, it will compute the average wage demanded by those
workers:
w¯it =
1
mit
mit∑
h=1
wsjht−1, (8)
where jh are the labels of workers in i’s queue. Next, it sets the contractual wage
for period t as a linear combination of w¯it and the satisﬁcing wage wsit−1. Thus:
wit = βwsit−1 + (1− β)w¯it, (9)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is an institutional parameter governing ﬁrms’ strength in wage
bargaining. A higher β implies a higher strength on the side of the ﬁrm in wage
setting. If β = 0, ﬁrms just set contractual wage as the average of wages demanded
by workers in the queue. If β = 1, ﬁrms do not take into account at all workers’
desiderata.
lIt must be noted that both job search scenarios only depict benchmark worlds and can be consid-
ered as starting points in our analysis. They indeed embody somewhat extreme assumptions about
search costs and interaction structures. For instance, in the “No Search Inertia” scenario, workers’
search costs are assumed to be negligible for the ﬁrst visited ﬁrm, while they become inﬁnite if
workers visit more than one ﬁrm. Moreover, in the “Search Inertia” one, employed workers only
recall their last employers. Alternative formulations of our basic model that we want to explore in
the future include allowing for: (i) search costs which smoothly increase with the number of visited
ﬁrms, and (ii) and the possibility for a worker to build through time networks of “preferred” ﬁrms
to guide his search.
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Once the ﬁrm has set the contractual wage at which it is willing to hire workers
in the queue, any worker j in the queue will accept the job only if wit exceeds the
reservation wage wRj .
As soon as a worker j accepts the job, he temporarily changes his satisﬁcing
wage to keep up with the new (actual) wage earned, i.e. wsjt−1 = wit. Similarly, a
ﬁrm who has ﬁlled at least a job opening will replace wsit−1 with wit.
m
Given the number of workers nit hired by each ﬁrm, production, as well as
price setting and proﬁts determination occur as explained above. Ex-post ﬁrm i’s
vacancies are deﬁned as v˜it = mit − nit.
3.5. Selection, exit, and entry
Suppose that — given the new contractual wage, price pt, and current productivity
αit−1 — ﬁrm j faces negative proﬁts, i.e. ptαit−1 < wit. Then selection pressure
makes ﬁrm j exit the market.
Each exiting ﬁrm is replaced by a new ﬁrm which starts out with the average
“characteristics” of those ﬁrms still in the market at t (i.e. those making non-
negative proﬁts).n Notice that this entry-exit process allows to keep an invariant
number of F ﬁrms in the economy at each t.
3.6. Satisficing wages updating
Surviving ﬁrms, as well as the N workers, will then have the opportunity to revise
their satisﬁcing wage according to their perceptions about the outcome of market
dynamics.
• Firms: We assume that each ﬁrm has an invariant desired ratio of ﬁlled to opened
jobs ρi ∈ (0, 1], which it compares to the current ratio:
rit =
nit
vit
. (10)
If ﬁrm i hired too few workers (as compared to the number of job positions it has
decided to open), then it might want to increase the wages it is willing to oﬀer
to workers. Otherwise, it might want to decrease it. We capture this simple rule
by positing that
wsit =
{
wsit−1(1 + |Y |), if rit < ρi,
wsit−1(1 − |Y |), if rit ≥ ρi,
(11)
where Y is an i.i.d. random variable distributed as a standard normal. Notice
that wsit−1 is equal to wit (i.e. contractual wage just oﬀered) if the ﬁrm has hired
at least one worker.
mThe new values of satisﬁcing wages will then be employed in the updating process. Since
satisﬁcing wage can be interpreted as (myopic) expectations, satisﬁcing wage updating plays in
the model the role of expectation formation process.
nAll results we present in the next section are robust to alternative assumptions concerning entry
and exit.
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• Workers: If worker j remains unemployed after matching and bargaining, he
might want to reduce his satisﬁcing wage (without violating the reservation wage
threshold). Otherwise, he might want to demand a higher wage during the next
bargaining session. We then assume that
wsjt =
{
max{wRj , wsjt−1(1− |Y |)}, if j unemployed,
wsjt−1(1 + |Y |), if j employed,
(12)
where Y is an i.i.d. random variable distributed as a standard normal. Again,
wsjt−1 = wjt if j has been just hired.
3.7. Technological progress
The last major ingredient of the model regards labor productivity dynamics. Here,
we experiment with two “technological scenarios.” In the ﬁrst one (“No Tech-
nological Progress”), we study a system where labor productivity does not
change through time (i.e. αit = αi, ∀i).o In the second scenario (“Technological
Progress”), we allow for an exogenous, albeit ﬁrm-speciﬁc, dynamics of labor pro-
ductivities. We start with initially homogeneous labor coeﬃcients (αi0 = α) and
we let them grow stochastically over time according to the following multiplicative
process:
αit = αit−1(1 + Z), (13)
where Z, conditionally on Z > 0, is an i.i.d. normally distributed random variable
with mean 0 and variance σ2Z ≥ 0.p The latter governs the opportunity setting in
the economy. The larger σZ , the more likely ﬁrms draw large productivity improve-
ments. Notice that if we let σZ = 0, we recover the “No Technological Progress”
scenario.q
3.8. Initial conditions, micro- and macro-dynamics
The foregoing model, as mentioned, genuinely belongs to an evolutionary/ACE
approach. Given its behavioral, bottom-up, perspective, one must resort to com-
puter simulations to explore the behavior of the system.r
The dynamics of the system depends on four sets of factors. First, we distinguish
behavioral (e.g. concerning job opening and job search) and technological scenar-
ios. We call such discrete institutional and technological regimes “system setups”.
oLabor productivity may in turn be either homogeneous across ﬁrms (αi = α) or not.
pHence, there is a probability 0.5 to draw a neutral labor productivity shock (Z = 0), while
positive shocks are distributed as the positive half of a N(0, 1).
qTechnological progress, despite its ﬁrm-speciﬁc nature, is essentially exogenous. An alternative
modeling strategy which we want to pursue in the future is to allow labor coeﬃcients to change
in a path-dependent way. For instance, one could assume that each αit is positively aﬀected by:
(i) past labor productivities of the ﬁrm where a new employed worker comes from, and/or (ii) the
number of time-periods a given worker has spent working in the same ﬁrm i.
rSimulation code is written in C++ and is available from the authors upon request.
July 28, 2004 0:15 WSPC/169-ACS 00013
168 G. Fagiolo, G. Dosi and R. Gabriele
Table 1. System parameters.
Parameter Range Meaning
N/F R++ Concentration of economic activity (number of workers/number of ﬁrms)
σv R++ Sensitivity to market signals in vacancy settings (only in a Weak
Path-Dependence Scenario)
β [0, 1] Labor-market institutional parameter governing the strength of ﬁrms in
wage-setting
σZ R+ Technological parameter tuning the availability of opportunities in the
system (= 0 means no technological progress)
Second, a choice of system parameters (F/N , σv, β, σZ) is required (see Table 1).
Third, one should explore the would-be importance of diﬀerent initial conditions.s
Since simulations show that the latter do not dramatically aﬀect the long-run prop-
erties of aggregate variables, we typically deﬁne a “canonical” set of initial condi-
tions. All results presented below refer to this benchmark choice. Finally, individual
updating by ﬁrms and workers induces a stochastic dynamics on micro-variables
(e.g. contractual wages, desired production, desired employment, etc.). By aggregat-
ing these individual variables over ﬁrms and workers, one can study the properties
of macro-dynamics for the variables of interest.
We will focus on unemployment:
Ut = N −
F∑
i=1
nit, (14)
total wages:
Wt =
N∑
j=1
wjt, (15)
and (real) GDP:
Qt =
F∑
i=1
qit, (16)
as well as its growth rate:
ht = ∆ log(Qt). (17)
4. Simulation Results: Some Qualitative Evidence
In this section, we ﬁrstly run simulation experiments in order to identify general
setups and parameters choices under which the model is able to jointly repli-
cate the three aggregate regularities characterizing labor markets dynamics and
sIn the model this implies deﬁning initial values (ni0, αi0, wsi0, wi0)
F
i=1 for ﬁrms and (w
s
j0)
N
j=1
for workers. Moreover, an initial price p0, and some distributions for desired ratios (ρi)Fi=1 and
reservation wages (wRj )
N
j=1 have to be chosen.
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economic activity discussed in Sec. 2. In the following section, we shall perform
Monte Carlo exercises aimed at understanding how statistical properties of labor-
market dynamics and economic activity change across diﬀerent parameterizations
and setups.
All simulation exercises we present in the paper refer to (and compare) four basic
“system setup.” Each “system setup” is characterized by a choice for behavioral/
institutional assumptions (i.e. job opening and workers’ job search) and a choice
for the technological scenario (with or without technological change).
We experiment with the following two combinations of behavioral/institutional
assumptions: (i) Walrasian Archetype (WA): We employ the “Wild Market
Archetype” scenario as far as job opening is concerned and the “No Search Inertia”
scenario for workers’ job search; (ii) Institutionally-Shaped Environment (ISE):
Firms open new job positions within a “Weak Path-Dependence” scenario, while
workers search for a ﬁrm under the “Search Inertia” scenario.
Note that in the WA world, there is no path-dependence in job openings, nor
in job search. Workers visit ﬁrms at random, while the latter open a number of
new positions in each period without being inﬂuenced by past experienced proﬁts.
Conversely, in the ISE workers and ﬁrms face some path-dependence in job opening
and job searching, as ﬁrms adjust job openings according to last proﬁts growth and
workers visit ﬁrst the last ﬁrm in which they were employed.
Each of the two foregoing behavioral choices is then associated to a technolog-
ical scenario (with or without technological change) to get the four basic “system
setups” under analysis.t
We start by qualitatively investigating the emergence of Beveridge, Wage, and
Okun curves in an economy characterized by the “Walrasian Archetype,” i.e. a world
where agents decide myopically and do not carry over past information. The sys-
tem does not allow to recover any aggregate, statistically signiﬁcant, negative rela-
tionship between vacancy and unemployment rates. Simulations show that the
Beveridge curve fails to emerge for a quite large region of the system parameters
(F/N , β, σZ) space, cf. Figs. 1 and 2 for an example.
Conversely, both Wage and Okun curves robustly emerge regardless of whether
technological progress is shut down or not. Notice that if σZ = 0, the economy
works as a dynamic allocation device trying to match in a decentralized and
imperfect way individual labor demand and supply for given resources. It is then
easy to see that both Okun and Wage relationships are a consequence (and not an
emergent property) of the joint assumptions of quasi-Walrasian price-setting and
constant returns to scale. Indeed, from (1) and (3), one gets: Wt = −ptUt +
pt
(
N − Nt +
∑
i αinit
)
and Qt = −Ut +
(
N − Nt +
∑
i αinit
)
. Thus, both curves
are somewhat implied by the assumptions.
tIn all exercises that follow, we set the econometric sample size T = 1000. This time span is
suﬃcient to allow for convergence of the recursive moments for all variables under study.
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Fig. 1. Vacancy versus unemployment rate in a “Walrasian Archetype” economy without tech-
nological progress. Parameters: N/F = 5, β = 0.5.
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Fig. 2. Vacancy versus unemployment rate in a “Walrasian Archetype” economy with techno-
logical progress. Parameters: N/F = 5, β = 0.5, σZ = 0.1.
If, on the contrary, technological progress occurs in a WA scenario, there is
no apparent reasons to expect both OC and WC to robustly emerge. Yet, as
simulations show, they both characterize system dynamics for a large region of
the parameter space, even if no path-dependent behavior drives the economy
(cf. Figs. 3 and 4).
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Fig. 3. Emergence of Wage curve in a “Walrasian Archetype” economy only with technological
progress. Parameters: N/F = 5, β = 0.5, σZ = 0.1.
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Fig. 4. Emergence of Okun curve in a “Walrasian Archetype” economy only with technological
progress. Parameters: N/F = 5, β = 0.5, σZ = 0.1.
Consider now an “Institutionally-Shaped Environment.” Then, irrespective of
the technological regime, the model is able to robustly generate Beveridge curves
with statistically signiﬁcant (negative) slopes: see for illustration Figs. 5 and 6.
Furthermore, when technological progress is present, both Wage and Okun curves
still characterize macro-dynamics as robust, emergent, properties of the system,
cf. Figs. 7 and 8.
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Fig. 5. Emergence of Beveridge curve in a “Institutionally-Shaped” environment without tech-
nological progress. Parameters: N/F = 5, β = 0.5.
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Fig. 6. Emergence of Beveridge curve in a “Institutionally-Shaped” environment with techno-
logical progress. Parameters: N/F = 5, β = 0.5, σZ = 0.1.
5. Monte Carlo Experiments
The set of qualitative results presented in the last section suggest that some
path-dependence seems to be a necessary condition for a Beveridge relationship.
Moreover, a standard Okun curve seems to be in place even when technolog-
ical progress persistently boosts available production capacity. Finally, despite
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Fig. 7. Emergence of Wage curve in a “Institutionally-Shaped” environment with technological
progress. Parameters: N/F = 5, β = 0.5, σZ = 0.1.
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Fig. 8. Emergence of Okun curve in a “Institutionally-Shaped” environment with technological
progress. Parameters: N/F = 5, β = 0.5, σZ = 0.1.
persistent heterogeneity arising endogenously from labor productivity dynamics,
Phillips-curve type of regularities are typically rejected by the simulated data in
favor of a Wage curve relationship.
To check whether these qualitative results are robust to changes in system
parameters, we turn now to a more detailed Monte Carlo analysis. We discuss two
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sets of exercises. First, we ask whether the three regularities we are interested in,
robustly emerge in each of the four main “setups” under study. To this end, we gen-
erate M independent (Monte Carlo) simulations for each choice of relevant param-
eters over a suﬃciently ﬁne grid. We then study the moments of the distributions of
the statistics of interest. We focus in particular on test statistics for the signiﬁcance
of coeﬃcients in Beveridge and Okun regressions, the magnitude of Okun coeﬃcient,
as well as test statistics discriminating between Wage and Phillips curves.
Second, we will perform some simple “comparative dynamics” exercises to inves-
tigate what happens to emergent regularities when one tunes system parameters
within each “setup”. We are particularly interested in detecting shifts (if any) in the
Beveridge curve and changes in Okun coeﬃcients. Once again, we will discuss the
outcome of Monte Carlo statistics coming from independent time-series simulation
runs for any given parametrization.u
5.1. Emergence of aggregate regularities: Robustness tests
To begin with, consider the emergence of Beveridge curves. Consider, for any setup
under analysis, a given parametrization. Following existing empirical literature, we
computed, for each of M independent simulated time-series, estimates (and R2) for
the simple time-series regression:
ut = b0 + b1vt + t, (18)
where t is white-noise, ut is the unemployment rate, and vt is the vacancy rate
(both deﬁned as activity rates). We then computed Monte Carlo statistics (e.g.
average) of estimates bˆ1 and goodness-of-ﬁt R2, together with the percentage of
rejections for the test b1 = 0 (i.e. a proxy for the likelihood of BC emergence, in
case of a negative estimate). By repeating this exercise as parameters change within
a given system setup (WA versus ISE), one is able to investigate Beveridge curves
emergence, how large their slopes are, and how good the correspondent linear ﬁt
on average is.v
Notice ﬁrst that, in a WA, the likelihood of the emergence of a BC is quite low.
As Fig. 9 shows, the percentage of rejections of H0: b1 = 0 is almost always below
50% as we tune ﬁrms’ strength in wage bargaining (β) and technological opportuni-
ties (σZ). Accordingly, the estimated slope does not change dramatically across the
parameter space, ranging from −0.938 to −0.263 (not shown). In particular, techno-
logical progress seems to favor BC emergence: the higher σZ , the larger the percent-
age of rejections and the better the ﬁt of the correspondent regression (cf. Fig. 10).
To see why this happens, recall that a stronger technological boost induces ﬁrms
to open more vacancies, which the system seems to be able to more easily ﬁll.
uAll Monte Carlo experiments are undertaken using a Monte Carlo sample size M = 100. Initial
conditions are always kept ﬁxed (see above).
vStandard errors of estimates, as well as Monte Carlo (across simulations) standard deviations of
all statistics of interest appear to be very small. Therefore, we do not report conﬁdence intervals
here.
July 28, 2004 0:15 WSPC/169-ACS 00013
An Evolutionary Model of Labor Market and Output Dynamics 175
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.1
0.3
0.7
1.0
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
%
 o
f r
eje
cti
on
s (
b 1=
0)
σz
β
Fig. 9. Percentage of rejections of H0: b1 = 0 for the Beveridge Regression ut = b0 + b1vt + t
in a “Walrasian Archetype” as ﬁrms’ strength in wage-setting (β) and technological opportunities
(σZ ) change (N/F = 5).
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Fig. 10. Goodness of ﬁt (R2) of Beveridge Regression ut = b0 + b1vt + t in a “Walrasian
Archetype” as ﬁrms’ strength in wage-setting (β) and technological opportunities (σZ ) change
(N/F = 5).
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When technology is strong enough, a lower β also appears to favor the emergence
of a BC, even if this eﬀect turns out to be milder than the technological one.
If, on the contrary, the economy is characterized by an “institutionally-shaped
environment,” the percentage of rejections is almost always close to 100% across
the entire (σv, σZ , β) space and the average estimated slope is negative (not shown).
Thus, unlike in a WA economy, the presence of some frictions and path-dependence
in the institutional and behavioral settings allows a BC to robustly emerge. Here,
ﬁrms’ bargaining strength (β) appears to have a strong impact on the goodness
of ﬁt. In fact, when β is low (β = 0.1), the linear ﬁt turns out to better describe
the vacancy-unemployment relationship (cf. Fig. 11) than in the case when ﬁrms’
bargaining strength is high (β = 1.0); see Fig. 12. In this latter case, however, a
higher sensitivity to market signals (σv) favors the emergence of well-shaped BC.
Indeed, in presence of technical progress, a larger σv allows ﬁrms to turn higher
proﬁts in a higher number of vacancies, which are more easily ﬁlled when ﬁrms are
stronger in the wage-bargaining process.
While the Beveridge curve tends to robustly emerge only in an “institutionally-
shaped” economy, simulations show that a Wage curve always characterizes our
system in all four setups. In particular, statistical tests aimed at discriminating
between a Phillips and a Wage world, show that the latter is almost always pre-
ferred. Following Ref. 13, we perform the lagged regression:
∆ log W˜t = gt + a1 log ut + a2 log ut−1 +∆et, (19)
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Fig. 11. Goodness of ﬁt (R2) of Beveridge Regression ut = b0 + b1vt + t in a “Institutionally-
shaped Environment” characterized by a low ﬁrms’ strength in wage-setting (β = 0.1) as ﬁrms’
sensitivity to market signals (σv) and technological opportunities (σZ ) change (N/F = 5).
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Fig. 12. Goodness of ﬁt (R2) of Beveridge Regression ut = b0 + b1vt + t in a “Institutionally-
Shaped Environment” characterized by a high ﬁrms’ strength in wage-setting (β = 1.0) as ﬁrms’
sensitivity to market signals (σv) and technological opportunities (σZ ) change (N/F = 5).
where W˜t is the wage rate, ut is the unemployment rate, gt is a time trend, and
ﬁrst-diﬀerencing is taken to avoid serial correlation in et. As Ref. 13 shows, the
Wage curve hypothesis implies a1 = −a2 (together with a1 < 0), while the Phillips
curve hypothesis requires a2 = 0. Table 2 reports Monte Carlo testing exercises in
our four setups for a benchmark parametrization.w Notice that the percentage of
rejections of a Phillips world is quite high, while we tend not to reject the hypothesis
that wage levels are negatively correlated with unemployment rates in almost all
simulations.
The R2 is very high in all setups. This might be an expected result when σZ = 0,
because without technological progress a Wage curve follows from price-setting and
constant returns. However, when σZ > 0 the goodness-of-ﬁt remains high (and stan-
dard errors very low). Our model seems to allow for well-behaved Wage curves also
when technological progress induces persistent heterogeneity in labor productivity
dynamics. Furthermore, a quite general and robust result (see also below) concerns
the eﬀect of technological progress upon the slope of the curve. As discussed above,
the latter is expected to be around −1.0 when σZ = 0, but nothing can in principle
be said about the expected slope when σZ > 0. Our results suggest that, even when
technological progress is present, the Wage curve robustly emerges. Indeed, wage
rates become even more responsive to unemployment than in the σZ = 0 case.
wAs far as the emergence of Okun and Wage curves are concerned, one does not detect any statis-
tically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in percentage of rejections when parameters change across diﬀerent
system setups. See below for some considerations on shifts of Beveridge and Okun curves across
diﬀerent parameterizations.
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Table 2. Emergence of the Wage curve in alternative setups.
Setups
WA ISE
σZ = 0 σZ > 0 σZ = 0 σZ > 0
MC average of aˆ1 −0.814 −1.643 −1.019 −2.329
(0.025) (0.093) (0.072) (0.225)
MC average of aˆ2 0.781 1.520 0.977 2.134
(0.019) (0.083) (0.020) (0.169)
R2 0.985 0.906 0.978 0.914
(0.003) (0.023) (0.017) (0.026)
% of rejections (H0: a2 = 0) at 5% 100% 99% 99% 100%
% of rejections (H0: a1 = −a2) at 5% 10% 5% 5% 1%
Note: WA = “Walrasian Archetype.” ISE = “Institutionally-Shaped Environment.” Functional
form tested: ∆ log W˜t = gt + a1 log ut + a2 log ut−1 + ∆et. Rejecting Phillips curve hypothesis
means rejecting H′o: a2 = 0. Rejecting Wage curve hypothesis means rejecting H′o: a1 = −a2.
Monte Carlo Standard Errors in parentheses. Monte Carlo sample size M = 100. Benchmark
parametrization: N/F = 5, β = 0.5, σZ = 0.1 (when > 0), σv = 0.1 (under ISE).
Table 3. Emergence of the Okun curve in alternative setups.
Setups
WA ISE
σZ = 0 σZ > 0 σZ = 0 σZ > 0
MC average of cˆ1 −2.064 −2.196 −2.635 −3.072
(0.042) (0.047) (0.068) (0.063)
R2 0.939 0.925 0.928 0.936
(0.026) (0.060) (0.064) (0.025)
Max of tail prob. distrib. for H0: c1 = 0 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
% of rejections (H0: c1 = 0) at 5% 100% 99% 100% 99%
Note: WA=“Walrasian Archetype.” ISE=“Institutionally-Shaped Environment.” Estimation of
∆ log(Qt) = c0 + c1∆ log(ut) + t. Monte Carlo Standard Errors in parentheses. Monte Carlo
sample size M = 100. Benchmark parametrization: N/F = 5, β = 0.5, σZ = 0.1 (when > 0),
σv = 0.1 (under ISE).
Alike the Wage curve, the Okun curve, too, turns out to be a robust outcome
of our labor market dynamics. Evidence of this eﬀect simply appears by linearly
regressing GDP growth rates against changes in the rates of unemployment:
∆ log(Qt) = c0 + c1∆log(ut) + t. (20)
We computed Monte Carlo estimates of the Okun coeﬃcient c1 and we tested for
H0: c1 = 0 (i.e. the emergence of an Okun curve — as long as c1 < 0), see Table 3 for
an example. Our economy allows for an Okun relationship in all settings, especially
when technological progress is present. Again, this might be considered as a not-
too-surprising result when σZ = 0, but it becomes a truly emergent property when
technological progress fuels the economy.
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The absolute value of the Okun coeﬃcient is larger than one (and indeed close
to empirical estimates [5]), implying some emergent aggregate dynamic increasing
returns to labor. The eﬀect becomes stronger when an ISE is assumed: Monte Carlo
averages of the Okun coeﬃcient range from −2.196 to −3.072.
Notice that one did not assume any increasing returns regime at the individual
ﬁrm level. In fact, ﬁrms produce using constant returns production functions; see
(1). Moreover, no Phillips curve relationships are in place: our economy typically
displays a negative relationship between unemployment rates and wage levels. This
suggests that aggregation of imperfect and persistently heterogeneous behaviors
leads to macro-economic dynamic properties that were not present at the individual
level. Therefore, aggregate dynamic increasing returns emerge as the outcome of
aggregation of dynamic, interdependent, microeconomic patterns [21].
5.2. Some comparative dynamics Monte Carlo exercises
We turn now to a comparative dynamics Monte Carlo investigation of the
eﬀect of system parameters on emergent aggregate regularities. We focus on the
“institutionally-shaped” setup, wherein the economy robustly exhibits well-behaved
Beveridge, Wage, and Okun curves, and we study what happens under alternative
parameter settings. In particular we compare parameter setups characterized by:
(i) low versus high N/F ratio (i.e. degrees of concentration of economic activity);
(ii) low versus high σv (i.e. sensitivity to market signals in the way ﬁrms set their
vacancies);
(iii) low versus high β (i.e. ﬁrms’ bargaining strength in wage setting);
(iv) low versus high σZ (technological opportunities).
We first ask whether a higher sensitivity to market signals in vacancy setting
induce detectable shifts in aggregate regularities. As Table 4 shows, the smaller σv
is, the stronger the revealed increasing dynamic returns: GDP growth becomes more
Table 4. Shifts in the Okun coeﬃcient in an “Institutionally-Shaped Environment” under alter-
native parameter settings.
ISE setup
σv = 1.0 (HSMS) σv = 0.2 (LSMS)
σZ = 0 σZ > 0 σZ = 0 σZ > 0
MC average of cˆ1 −2.700 −2.960 −2.900 −3.270
(0.082) (0.085) (0.064) (0.060)
R2 0.928 0.936 0.939 0.925
(0.064) (0.025) (0.026) (0.060)
Max of tail prob. distrib. for H0: c1 = 0 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
% of rejections (H0: c1 = 0) at 5% 100% 99% 100% 99%
Note: HSMS: High Sensitivity to Market Signals. LSMS: Low Sensitivity to Market Signals. Esti-
mation of ∆ log(Qt) = c0 + c1∆log(ut) + t. Monte Carlo Standard Errors in parentheses. Monte
Carlo sample size M = 100. Benchmark parametrization: N/F = 5, β = 0.5, σZ = 0.1.
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responsive to unemployment growth and the Okun curve becomes steeper. Notice
that σv can also be interpreted as an inverse measure of path-dependence in ﬁrms’
vacancy setting. The smaller σv is, the more ﬁrms tend to stick to last-period job
openings. Therefore, a smaller path-dependence implies a steeper Okun relation.
Analogously, we investigate the impact on the BC of simultaneously increasing
N/F (i.e. increasing N for a given F ) and σv (i.e. ﬁrms’ “sensitivity to market sig-
nals”). Notice that a higher concentration allows ﬁrms — ceteris paribus — to more
easily ﬁll their vacancies. Similarly, the higher σv, the more ﬁrms are able to react
to aggregate conditions and correspondingly adjust vacancies. Therefore, one might
be tempted to interpret economies characterized by high values for both N/F and
σv as “low friction” worlds, and expect the BC curve to lie closer to the axes. Notice,
however, that in our model an “indirect” eﬀect is also present. If labor demand is
very low (e.g. because the economy is in a recession), then the unemployment rate
might be high irrespective of the value of N/F . Moreover, if σv is high, ﬁrms will
ﬁre more workers during downswings, thus inducing a sort of “accelerator” eﬀect
on the recession. Hence, the consequences on the BC of assuming a larger market
concentration and a higher sensitivity to market signals are ex-ante ambiguous: if
the “indirect” eﬀects dominate, we should observe various combinations between
shifts to the right and “business-cycle” movements along the curve.
Notwithstanding all that, Monte Carlo simulations show that the model is able
to reproduce the predicted shifts in the BC. We observe (cf. Table 5) that as N/F
Table 5. Shifts in the Beveridge curve in an “Institutionally-Shaped Environment” under alter-
native parameter settings.
Parameter settings
N/F 50 20 10 5
σv 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.1
MC mean of bˆ0 0.684 0.689 0.691 0.692
(0.018) (0.024) (0.043) (0.043)
MC mean of σ(bˆ0) 0.020 0.027 0.040 0.033
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Max of MC tail prob. distr. for H0: b0 = 0 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
% of rejections for H0: b0 = 0 99% 100% 98% 99%
MC mean of bˆ1 −0.679 −0.631 −0.535 −0.413
(0.030) (0.043) (0.071) (0.077)
MC Mean of σ(bˆ1) 0.031 0.044 0.065 0.056
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Max of MC tail prob. distr. for H0: b1 = 0 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001
% of rejections for H0: b1 = 0 100% 99% 98% 99%
MC mean of R2 0.816 0.677 0.408 0.410
(0.038) (0.045) (0.064) (0.062)
Note: Setups: (i) Concentration of economic activity N/F ; (ii) sensitivity to market signals σv.
Estimation of ut = b0 + b1vt + t. Monte Carlo Standard Errors in parentheses. Monte Carlo
sample size M = 100. Benchmark parametrization: β = 0.5. No technical progress is assumed to
focus on BC shifts for given resources.
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and σv both increase in a ISE economy, Monte Carlo averages of estimated inter-
cepts stay constant, while the BC becomes, on average, steeper (and thus closer to
the origin). A steeper BC implies that ﬁrms adaptively learn to open less vacancies
and to adjust their ﬁlled-to-open vacancy ratios in response to market signals.
Second, we explore what happens to (within-simulation) average and standard
deviation of GDP growth time-seriesx when both σv and ﬁrms’ bargaining strength
β are allowed to vary. Recall that the higher β, the less ﬁrms take into account
workers satisﬁcing wages when they decide their contractual wage. Figures 13 and 14
show Monte Carlo means of average and standard deviation of GDP growth rates.
We ﬁnd that the higher ﬁrms’ bargaining strength, the smaller both average growth
rates and their variability. Thus, allowing for some bargaining power on the workers’
side implies better aggregate performance, but also more ﬂuctuations. Furthermore,
if ﬁrms are less responsive to market signals (e.g. they employ a path-dependent
vacancy setting rule), the economy enjoys persistently higher average growth rates
and persistently smaller ﬂuctuations.
Finally, we assess the consequences of “fueling” the economy with higher tech-
nological opportunities (i.e. higher σZ) for diﬀerent levels of β (and setting σv
to an intermediate level). While a higher σZ implies higher average growth rates
in all parameter settings (Fig. 15), a stronger bargaining power for workers still
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Fig. 13. Monte Carlo Means of (within-simulation) Average Real GDP Growth Rates as a func-
tion of ﬁrms strength in wage bargaining (β). LSMS versus HSMS: Low (σv = 0.1) versus High
(σv = 1.0) sensitivity to market signals in vacancy setting. “Institutionally-Shaped” Environment.
Parameters: N/F = 5, σZ = 0.1.
xThat is, we compute average and standard deviation of GDP growth rates within a simulation
{ht, t = 1, . . . , T}, ht = ∆logQt.
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Fig. 14. Monte Carlo Means of (within-simulation) Standard Deviation of Real GDP Growth
Rates as a function of ﬁrms strength in wage bargaining (β). LSMS versus HSMS: Low (σv = 0.1)
versus High (σv = 1.0) sensitivity to market signals in vacancy setting. “Institutionally-Shaped”
Environment. Parameters: N/F = 5, σZ = 0.1.
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Fig. 15. Monte Carlo Means of (within-simulation) Average Real GDP Growth Rates as
a function of technological opportunities (σZ ) and ﬁrms strength in wage bargaining (β).
“Institutionally-Shaped” Environment. Parameters: N/F = 5, σv = 0.1.
July 28, 2004 0:15 WSPC/169-ACS 00013
An Evolutionary Model of Labor Market and Output Dynamics 183
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
Technological Opportunities (σz)
M
C 
M
ea
n 
of
 S
td
. D
ev
. o
f G
D
P 
G
ro
w
th
 R
at
es β=0.0
β=0.5
β=1.0
Fig. 16. Monte Carlo Means of (within-simulation) Standard Deviation of Real GDP Growth
Rates as a function of technological opportunities (σZ ) and ﬁrms strength in wage bargaining (β).
“Institutionally-Shaped” Environment. Parameters: N/F = 5, σv = 0.1.
implies better aggregate performances. Together, more technological opportunities
also entail a higher volatility in the growth process (see Fig. 16). Volatility can be
weakened if one increases ﬁrm strength in wage bargaining.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented an evolutionary model of output and labor market
dynamics describing from the bottom-up individual behaviors of multiple ﬁrms and
workers and their interactions. In particular, we have explicitly modeled from an
agent-based perspective the processes of vacancy setting, as well as matching, wage
bargaining, and wage setting.
We assume that ﬁrms produce a homogeneous, perishable good under constant
returns to labor, enjoy labor productivity improvements thanks to technological
progress, and undergo a selection process shaped by their revealed competitiveness
(which is also aﬀected by their hiring and wage-setting behaviors). Both demand
and price formation are modeled as endogenous processes.
The interplay between labor and output markets allows one to appreciate the
relationships between the business cycle and unemployment. Such an interplay pro-
vides a joint, evolutionary, interpretation of some of the most important aggregate
stylized facts in labor market dynamics and the business cycle, such as the Beveridge
curve, the Wage curve, and the Okun curve.
July 28, 2004 0:15 WSPC/169-ACS 00013
184 G. Fagiolo, G. Dosi and R. Gabriele
Simulations show that Beveridge, Wage and Okun curves can be jointly gener-
ated by our model as emergent properties under quite broad behavioral and insti-
tutional settings. Moreover, the emergent Okun curves exhibit aggregate dynamic
increasing returns notwithstanding ﬁrms employing linear production functions.
Monte Carlo simulations also indicate that statistically detectable shifts in Okun
and Beveridge curves emerge as the result of changes in institutional, behavioral,
and technological parameters. For example, a higher concentration of market activ-
ity (i.e. a higher number of workers per ﬁrm) and a higher sensitivity to market
signals in ﬁrms’ vacancy setting rules imply Beveridge curves which lie closer to the
axes.
Finally, the model generates quite sharp predictions about how the average
aggregate performance (and volatility) of the system changes in alternative behav-
ioral, institutional, and technological setups. For example, we ﬁnd that the higher
ﬁrms’ bargaining strength, the smaller both average growth rates and their variabil-
ity. Furthermore, if ﬁrms are less responsive to market signals, the economy enjoys
persistently higher average growth rates and persistently smaller ﬂuctuations. Sim-
ilarly, higher technological opportunities imply higher average growth rates but
more volatile growth rate time-series. Volatility can, however, be weakened if one
increases ﬁrms strength in wage bargaining.
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